Think of a person (nation) living in a capitalist country (world) who knows that he has to work hard to pay 'bills'
... he has to pay rent for living in a capitalist country ... he has to pay for food, for clothing, he has to pay
taxes. And for this a person needs a source of income (he needs money, he needs a job).
Now, economic warfare stops the flow of income coming to the person (or nation). This is done by denying access
to such income; for example, a person cannot find a job (or, a person is denied information that will help him 'compete'
in the job market.) Or, in the case of a nation, a nation is denied access to its accumulated wealth (and thus, it can't
trade, can't buy, can't sell ... ) such nation is denied further lending (which is a form of making money. I.e.,
money making money) and is denied from further borrowing from other nations.
Economic Warfare destroys a person or nation economically.
On Guerilla Warfare
Every guerilla war, every growing and active resistance movement,
must in order to thrive posses an 'IDEA' which binds the guerillas or the members of the movement together. This 'Idea' must
be strong enough to arouse and perpetually renew the energy and determination of the partisans. Training and the highest qualities
of Leadership, are, of course, necessary for systematic partisan warfare, but the morale of the individual remains always
the decisive factor. [emphasis, mine]
Taken from: 'The Labyrinth' by
'I've got it figured.
I've had two seperate folks tell me there have been strangers around these parts last couple night.
Can't tell what they look like. 'Cause they're staying in the shadows -- covertlike. Nobody's been
hurt, mind you. And that's the giveaway.
It's called "probing." It's a military procedure.
You send out a reconnaissance group -- very small -- to check things out.
Not to engage but to evaluate the situation -- evaluate the level of danger, make sure things are all clear
... clear [for the invasion].
'You can never map out a strategy from A to Z. You must have enough flexibility to change course, to accommodate
the line of action to changing historical circumstances, without ever losing sight of the strategic objective. That
is the great lesson of the FSLN.'
(Comandante Henry Ruiz, 'Modesto')
From FOCO to Insurrection: Sandinista Strategies of Revolution
Our principles of operation are:
(1) Attack dispersed isolated enemy forces first; attack
concentrated strong enemy forces later.
(2) Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas
first; take big cities later.
(3) Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main
objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place is the outcome
of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a city or place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed
hands a number of times.
(4) In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force
(two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive
to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing the
enemy crushing blows, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and an attack on one or both of his flanks,
with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy
forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, although
inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we shall be superior in every part and every specific campaign, and this ensures
victory in the campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out the entire enemy.
(5) Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not
sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set
of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves.
(6) Give full play to our style of fighting - courage in
battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short
time without rest).
(7) Strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move.
At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities.
(8) Concerning attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy
fortified points and cities that are weakly defended. At opportune moments, seize all enemy fortified points and cities defended
with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. As for all strongly defended enemy fortified points and cities, wait
until conditions are ripe and then take them.
(9) Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of
the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army's main sources of manpower and materiel are at the front.
(10) Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to
rest, train and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training and consolidation should not in general be very long, and
the enemy should as far as possible be permitted no breathing space. These are the main methods the People's Liberation Army
has employed in defeating Chiang Kai-shek. They are the result of the tempering of the People's Liberation Army in long years
of fighting against domestic and foreign enemies and are completely suited to our present situation . . .. our strategy and
tactics are based on a people's war; no army opposed to the people can use our strategy and tactics.
"The Present Situation and Our Tasks" (December 25, 1947),
Selected Military Writings, 2nd ed., pp. 349-50.*
Quotations from Mao Tse Tung 8. People's War
Liberalism manifests itself in various ways. To let things slide
for the sake of peace and friendship when a person has clearly gone wrong, and refrain from principled argument because he
is an old acquaintance, a fellow townsman, a schoolmate, a close friend, a loved one, an old colleague or old subordinate.
Or to touch on the matter lightly instead of going into it thoroughly, so as to keep on good terms. The result is that both
the organization and the individual are harmed. This is one type of liberalism. To indulge in irresponsible criticism in private
instead of actively putting forward one's suggestions to the organization. To say nothing to people to their faces but to
gossip behind their backs, or to say nothing at a meeting but to gossip afterwards. To show no regard at all for the principles
of collective life but to follow one's own inclination. This is a second type. To let things drift if they do not affect one
personally; to say as little as possible while knowing perfectly well what is wrong, to be worldly wise and play safe and
seek only to avoid blame. This is a third type. Not to obey orders but to give pride of place to one's own opinions. To demand
special consideration from the organization but to reject its discipline. This is a fourth type. To indulge in personal attacks,
pick quarrels, vent personal spite or seek revenge instead of entering into an argument and struggling against incorrect views
for the sake of unity or progress or getting the work done properly. This is a fifth type. To hear incorrect views without
rebutting them and even to hear counter-revolutionary remarks without reporting them, but instead to take them calmly as if
nothing had happened. This is a sixth type. To be among the masses and fail to conduct propaganda and agitation or speak at
meetings or conduct investigations and inquiries among them, and instead to be indifferent to them and show no concern for
their well-being, forgetting that one is a communist and behaving as if one were an ordinary non-Communist. This is a seventh
type. To see someone harming the interests of the masses and yet not feel indignant, or dissuade or stop him or reason with
him, but to allow him to continue. This is an eighth type. To work half-heartedly without a definite plan or direction; to
work perfunctorily and muddle along - "So long as one remains a monk, one goes on tolling the bell." This is a ninth type.
To regard oneself as having rendered great service to the revolution, to pride oneself on being a veteran, to disdain minor
assignments while being quite unequal to major tasks, to be slipshod in work and slack in study. This is a tenth type. To
be aware of one's own mistakes and yet make no attempt to correct them, taking a liberal attitude towards oneself. This is
an eleventh type.
"Combat Liberalism" (September 7, 1937), Selected Works, Vol. II, pp. 31-32.
Quotations from Mao Tse Tung 24. Correcting Mistaken Ideas